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This paper presents a basic assessment of the financial performance of infrastructure service operators in 
developing countries. It relies on a new database of 120 companies  put together to track the evolution of the cost 
of capital, the cost of equity and the return to equity for electricity, water and sanitation, railways and port 
operators in 31 developing countries distributed evenly across low-income, low-middle income and upper-
middle-income countries. The paper shows that between 1998 and 2002, the average cost of capital in 
developing countries varied from less than 11% to over 15% across regions and sectors while the cost of equity 
varied from around 13% to over 22%.  Low-middle-income countries have recovered relatively well from the 
East Asia crisis, while low-income and upper-middle-income countries have seen their situation deteriorate since 
the crisis. At the regional level, the main story is that  East Asia is recovering quite well from its crisis, and that 
the financial performance of the operators in Africa and Latin America has deteriorated.  Eastern Europe and 
South Asia are doing relatively better but show a large volatility of returns over time and within sectors. At the 
sector level, the railways and the energy sectors have seen their performance deteriorate significantly over the 
period, while the water and port sectors have done relatively better. In all sectors and regions,  the average return 
to equity has been lower than the cost of equity since the Asian crisis. 
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During the 1990s, private sector commitments to infrastructure projects in developing 
countries amounted to about US$805 billion, or about US$67 billion/year. Private sector 
investment represented about 20-25% of the investment expenditures of these countries 
during that period.  This average figure hides the strong fluctuations caused by increased 
global financial instability. Indeed, commitments increased sharply up to 1997, when they 
started to decline rapidly after the Asia crises was followed by similar crisis in Russia, Brazil 
and more recently Argentina. In 2002, commitments totaled US$46.7 billion, the lowest level 
of investment since 1994.  
It is now almost a panecea to state that the significant slow down in private investments in 
infrastructure is simply the reaction to unacceptable levels of risk from the point of view of 
potential infrastructure service operators. There is a sense that projects do not generate the 
cash flows needed to at least operate and maintain infrastructure. There is also a clear   
concern that exchange rate risk levels have become increasingly incompatible with the fact 
that the cash flows for many of the services are generated in local currency, while investors 
and borrowers want dividends and debt service in hard currency.  
The decline in private sector commitments has fueled the debate on the realism of the 
expectation to have the private sector contribute to the infrastructure financing needs of the 
developing countries. Some observers are convinced that this is only a temporary slowdown 
and that the private sector will return. Many others are more skeptical not only about the 
return of private investors, but in some cases also the desirability of this return. The odds are, 
however, that the private sector will eventually return, at least in the high-potential countries. 
This is simply because these countries represent large markets with significant potential 
returns on investment in the long run. But public-private partnerships will also survive the 
current crisis because few developing countries will be able to address their extraordinary 
infrastructure needs from public resources alone.
2 Ultimately, the disagreement should 
probably be as to how fast the private sector will return to some countries and under what 
conditions. 
When the private sector returns in larger numbers, it will indeed do so in very different 
forms from those we have observed in the 1990s. Their willingness to accept risk will be 
limited. This will require new contractual arrangements with different levels and types of risk-
sharing arrangements. It will also imply new actors, including non-OECD (Organization for 
economic cooperation and development) actors willing to compete in risky environments they 
are more familiar with than OECD operators—e.g. South African infrastructure firms are 
increasingly present throughout Africa,  Malaysian firms in Asia and Africa, Brazilian and 
Mexican firms throughout Latin America.  
The new business models also demand better governance in business practices. An 
improvement in the accountability of all stakeholders in public-private partnerships will 
require much more transparency in the analytical and quantitative assessments of deals. These 
                                                 
1 This paper extends to all developing countries of  part of a database put together for Latin America by Sirtaine 
et al. (2004) for Latin America but covers a much shorter period and a lower number of return indicators. 
2 For the poorest countries unable to attract private investment, the alternative is likely to be grants from richer 
countries.    2
assessments are needed to facilitate debates between governments and operators on the 
specific levels of risks associated with any project and on their distribution. This debate has 
already started in Argentina, Brazil, Kenya, Mali, Mexico or Uganda where electricity, ports 
or water operators and regulators or governments are arguing about quantitative estimates of 
the rate of return required by operators to match the demands of their equity and bond holders.      
This paper’s main goal is to provide a quantitative baseline of the risks perceived between 
1998 and 2002 by private providers for a range of infrastructure services in a range of 
developing countries based on a sample of 120 companies.  We do so by calculating the 
hurdle rates for each one of these operations (that is, the risk-adjusted cost of capital faced by 
the operators).  The data available do not allow the assessment of the financial viability of 
these operations but allow a comparison of the returns on equity with the cost of equity for the 
same sample. This comparison is used to highlight the origin of the concerns of private 
investors.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the methodology and the data. 
Section 3 presents the estimates of the cost of capital.  Section 4 compares the cost of equity 
to the return on equity to get a sense of the returns that are consistent with the risks perceived 
by investors in infrastructure. Section 5 presents the results on the cost of capital,  and section 
6 on the comparison between the cost of equity and the return on equity. Section 7 privides 
some insights on the volatility of returns and costs. Section 8 reviews the evolution of the 
indicators over time. Section 9 concludes.  
 
2.  The Sample of Companies 
 
We focused on companies active in four infrastructure sectors: energy, water, ports and 
railways. We only used publicly available information on the Web. Indeed, various 
commercial databases and a Web search provided us with the balance sheets, financial 
statements and related information for 120 companies. The information was checked 
whenever possible either on the site of the companies or on the sites of their regulators in the 
countries in which they are operating. We also relied on reports generated by credit rating 
agencies or investment banks to cross reference the information. The sample covers 31 
developing countries in five regions: Sub-Saharan Africa & MENA (11), South Asia (12), 
East Asia (30), Europe & Central Asia (12), Latin America and the Caribbean (55). Latin 
America and East Asia provide, as expected, the largest number of companies since these are 
the two regions which generate over 75% of public-private partnerships over the 1990s. The 
distribution of the sample per income groups or geographical regions, per sector is 
summarized in Table 1.  
The table points clearly to the limited statistical significance of the sectoral observations 
for the water, port and rail sample in Africa, South Asia and Eastern Europe. Classifications 
by country income group (low-income, lower-middle-income, upper-middle-income) were 
less problematic because they take all countries with the same average risk level and compare 
them with appropriate hurdle rates, which have the same average risk level as well. The 
sample size for the low income group is however also limited for all sectors, except energy. 
 
   3
 
Table 1:  The sample of concessions used 
 
 
The actual sample we collected was somewhat larger in the hope to have enough 
coverage of every region and sector but we also imposed a number of restrictions to maintain 
a minimum level of quality in the sample. To be included in our sample, a company had to 
have a minimum of at least 5 years of operations (in order to have a time series of data of 
adequate duration for the analysis). Moreover, only audited financial statements and official 
company information releases were used.   
We have four major potential problems with our data sample which need to be taken 
into account when analyzing the results. First, because companies must obey the accounting 
standards of the countries where they operate, they may follow different accounting rules 
when preparing their financial statements. Although accounting standards in all the countries 
considered are based on international accounting standards (IAS), discrepancies across 
countries may generate differences in earnings. No attempt was made to adjust financial 
statements for possible differences in accounting standards.  
Second, no matter where they operate, companies generally do not publish certain data 
that would have been helpful for the analysis. This includes, for example, information on the 
fair value of some assets, depreciation and amortization rules, and detailed classification of 
costs. It also applies to the market value of assets and liabilities, so the analysis is based on 
their book value. 
 Third, some analysts argue that regulations sometimes create incentives for investors 
to present their accounts in a way that shows the lowest possible return or profitability. This 
can happen, for example, when regulated tariffs are set to ensure a minimum return to 
concessionaires—encouraging them to minimize their historical returns in order to maximize 
future tariff increases. Since different countries and different sectors follow different 
regulatory regimes, this may be additional source of distortion. We did not take this one into 
account either.
3 
 Fourth, the financial results of infrastructure concessions are usually sensitive to their 
life cycles. It is not uncommon to incur losses in the early years, when processes are being 
adjusted and heavy investments are often made. By contrast, profitability usually increases in 
                                                 
3 See for instance Alexander et al (2001) for illustrations of the relevance of the regulatory regime for the 
assessment of the cost of capital 
Total by Country Total by company
Energy Water Port Rail
Low income 9 18 12 2 2 2
Lower middle income 11 38 16 8 11 3
Upper middle income 11 64 20 14 19 11
Total 31 120 48 24 32 16
Sub-Saharan Africa & Mena 9 11 7 3 1 0
South Asia 3 11 7 0 2 2
East Asia & Pacific  4 31 12 5 11 3
Europe and Central Asia 6 12 7 0 3 2
Latin America and Caribbean 9 55 15 16 15 9
Total 31 120 48 24 32 16
Total By Sector  4
later years as systems become more efficient. Thus comparing companies at different stages 
of their life cycles is not ideal. Accordingly, no attempt is made to compare data for 
individual concessions, because doing so might not be meaningful. But this problem is not as 
severe when calculating averages for the entire sample, because the sample contains 
concessions at most stages of their life cycles 
 
3.  The Methodology and the basic data  
 
Since the initial purpose of the paper is to get a sense of the recent evolution in the risk 
levels faced by operators, it is essential to be able to quantify these risks in a systematic 
manner across regions, across sector and over time. These risks are best assessed by 
estimating what drives the rates of return demanded by these companies from governments in 
developing countries. These demands are driven  the main sources of risks types and levels 
perceived by the shareholders and the lenders to private operators in developing countries and 
lead to what amounts to a hurdle for the projects. This is why the first stage of the 
methodology followed in this paper is to assess this hurdle rate.  
For regulated industries as those covered in this paper, a standard way to assess 
quantitatively this rate is to estimate the cost of capital faced by the operators on a specific 
project. The weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is the expected return on all of a 
company’s securities. It is measured as the average return required on each source of 
capital—such as stock, bonds, and other debts—weighted by the share of each in the 
company’s financing structure. The calculation is often simplified by grouping the various 
sources of capital into just two categories: equity and fixed income or debt instruments. It is 
the appropriate hurdle rate for measures of returns on a project’s overall liabilities. Formally, 
WACC is estimated by:   
() [] [ ] d e C T g C g WACC * ) 1 ( * * 1 − + − =      (1) 
where: 
g  is the level of leverage (or gearing in the UK) in a company, i.e. the proportion 
of debt in the total capital structure (i.e. debt + equity or D + E where E is the book 
value of equity and  D is long-term debt); 
Cd is the cost of debt finance. This is simply measured as risk free rate, rf  plus a  
debt premium over this rate, pd .  
Ce  is the cost of equity finance; it is a measure of the return investors require on 
equity investments, given the level of risk of such investments;  its estimation raises 
bigger problems and yet for privatized infrastructure monopolies, it is quite 
important since access to debt finance can be quite restricted for many developing 
countries privatization projects. 
T is the nominal corporate income tax rate. 
  In a developing country context, the assessment of each one of these components is 
quite challenging. The most difficult task, however, ended up being the estimation of the cost   5
of equity. One of the common approaches adopted to measuring the cost of equity is the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
 4  The estimate the cost of equity follows formula (2): 
CE = rf + ße * (rm –rf) + Crp        (2) 
where: rf  = risk free rate 
 ß e = the equity beta of the project 
 r m = expected stock market return 
Crp = country risk premium 
  
The risk-free rate of return (rf) is a benchmark figure against which all investments 
in an economy should be measured. Being risk-free requires the removal, or minimization, of 
repayment risk. Owing to the ability of a government to raise finance through taxation, 
government bonds are normally taken as the base value for the calculation.  But sometimes 
governments in emerging or developing markets have failed to meet their financial 
obligations—and thus are clearly not risk-free. As a result the interest rate on U.S. three-
month Treasury bills is usually considered the best approximation of a risk-free rate. Here the 
risk-free rate is calculated using the geometric average of the average annual interest rate on 
U.S. three-month Treasury bonds over a 40-year period (from 1962–2002). This average 
produces a risk-free rate of 6.96 percent. Table A1, in the appendix, contains the data used in 
the calculation. Annual averages were used because all of our measures of returns are annual. 
A 40-year timeframe was used because it is broadly consistent with the average duration of 
the infrastructure concessions and because it is long enough not to be distorted by short-term 
economic circumstances. Finally, a geometric average was used (instead of an arithmetic 
average) because empirical evidence suggests that, over a long period, returns become serially 
correlated. 
  The market risk premium (rm - rf) relates to the level of additional return that is 
required to persuade investors to hold equities in preference to the risk free instrument. There 
is much controversy surrounding the calculation of this element—recent UK regulatory 
experience has generated figures between 3% and 6% while some parts of traditional finance 
theory suggests orders of magnitude of at most 2%. An alternative is to measure the historical 
spread between the yield on a government security and that of a general market index--in the 
US, this could be the spread between the yield on a 1 year Treasury Bill and the returns on the 
500 Standard & Poor index.  We used the geometric average of these excess returns over 
1962–2002, and obtained a market risk premium of 2.94 percent.
5 
                                                 
4  Note that the CAPM approach has often been criticized for a number of conceptual reasons including a number of 
assumptions made on the efficiency of the markets.  Some of the criticisms are particularly relevant for developing countries  
where capital markets are typically even less perfect than in developed countries. There is, however, no unanimous 
agreement on any other model for now and the CAPM continues to be the approach underlying most tariff revisions in 
developing countries as well as in developed countries. For a recent survey of practice, see Alexander (2004). Note that he 
observation that expected returns are related to risk through the CAPM was first formalized by Jack Trenor, William Sharpe 
(1964), and John Lintner (1965). 
 
5 The average returns on stocks between 1962 and 2002 was 9.9% while the yield on the US Tbill was 9.96%. 
The difference gives the market risk premium of 2.94%.   6
  The equity beta (βe) measures the relative risk of the company’s equity compared to 
the market as a whole. In other words, the risk premium investors require for taking on a 
riskier investment varies in direct proportion to its beta. Betas are estimated regularly by 
numerous specialized private companies. Some companies use a simple covariance method, 
based on historical stock prices, to get a historical beta.
6 Although some studies have shown 
that betas appear reasonably stable (see Sharpe and Cooper 1972),
   historical betas are 
imperfect guides to the future because a stock’s market risk can change considerably. 
Accordingly, some other companies, such as Barra,
7 use more forward-looking 
methodologies—adjusting historical betas to take into account forward-looking quantitative 
and qualitative information about the stock and its environment (including the regulatory 
framework). The results, called predicted or fundamental betas, are considered superior to 
historical betas because they incorporate new information that may influence the stock’s 
future volatility. Thus they  are better predictors of an asset’s future response to market 
movements which is why we used them here. But companies such as Barra do not calculate 
betas for nontraded companies or for small companies with limited liquidity, especially in 
emerging markets. Therefore, one must use proxies. We proxied the betas of our sample 
concessions using the average predicted betas estimated by Barra for U.S. companies 
operating in the same sectors.
8 The resulting betas are summarized in Table 2. The average 
betas are less than 1 for all the infrastructure sectors considered in this paper analysis. That 
means that stocks of companies in those sectors are usually less volatile than the market, so 
investments in those sectors are less risky than in sectors with higher betas. This reflects the 
fact that these sectors enjoy more stable economics—particularly more stable demand—than 
do other sectors. 
Table 2: Sector Specific Betas 
Average 
Unleveraged Betas 
1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Electricity  0.46 0.36 0.36 0.31 0.36 
Water & Sanitation  0.42 0.36 0.51 0.34 0.31 
Railroad  0.82 0.66 0.53 0.53 0.55 
Ports  0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 
Source:Barra betas by sector 
Note: For ports, we used the betas for maritime transport 
 
To isolate the risks resulting from a company’s financing structure from its 
fundamental business risk, betas are usually calculated assuming that the company has a 
                                                 
6 A stock’s relative volatility is measured as the ratio of the covariance between the stock’s and the market’s return divided 
by the variance of the market’s return. 
7 Barra, a U.S. company founded in 1975, became famous for its multifactor model for measuring the risk of 
stock portfolios. Its estimates of betas are used by many investment banks and stock brokers. 
8 European companies were used when Barra’s data for U.S. companies were insufficient. For instance, Barra’s 
data do not separate U.S. energy distributors and generators. So, its data for European energy companies were 
used.   7
hypothetical unleveraged financial structure. (They are then called unleveraged or unlevered 
betas.) All the betas in Table 2 are unleveraged. To account for the extra risk embedded in 
companies’ leveraged capital structure (making them leveraged or levered betas), they must 
be releveraged using the formula (3): 
ßL = ßU * [1 + D / E * (1 – T)],  (3) 
where ßL is the leveraged beta, ßU is the unleveraged beta, D is outstanding long-term debt, E 
is total equity, and T is the corporate income tax rate. In this analysis, unleveraged betas were 
transformed into leveraged betas using a capital structure typical for each sector estimated as 
the average leverage of our sample companies which are summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3: Average leverage by sector 
  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Electricity  87% 87% 87% 86% 97% 
Water & Sanitation  103%  112% 83%  79% 145% 
Railroad  43% 45% 46% 50% 76% 
Ports  104% 93% 106%  122% 90% 
Source: own calculations based on sample data 
 
 The  country risk premium (Crp) is the extra return that investors require to invest in 
stocks of companies in a country deemed riskier than a less risky country used as benchmark 
(often the United States). The premium reflects the potential volatility of investments in a 
given country due to defaults associated with political or other events. Country risk premiums 
are usually estimated as the average spread over U.S. Treasury bonds (assumed to be risk-
free) of U.S. corporate bonds with a credit rating equivalent to that of the country under 
consideration (called the default spread). To estimate these spreads, we used default spreads 
estimated by Reuters for a large number of utilities worldwide. 
9 However, Reuters does not 
calculate this default spread for a number of developing countries such as, but not limited to 
Mozambique, Cameroon, Georgia and Estonia. As a result, for these countries, we utilized 
Fitch, Standard & Poor or Moody’s ratings where available and then, proxied these default 
spreads using rating equivalences published by Moody’s. 
The country risk premium is the most discriminating factor among countries, ranging 
from less than 1 percent in Chile and South Africa to 13-15 percent in Argentina, Kenya and 
Venezuela. It is also highly volatile—varying, for example, from 8 percent in 1998 to 13 
percent in 2002 in Argentina. This is because it is influenced by many factors subject to 
frequent shocks and variations, including exchange rate risk, political risk, and regulation risk. 
It is for this reason that one needs to make sure the calculation compares investors’ expected 
                                                 
9 Some authors argue that the country risk premium is likely to be higher than the country’s default spread. Instead, they 
multiply the default spread by the ratio of the volatility of the equity market to that of the bond market in the country under 
consideration (sometimes proxied by the same ratio globally of 1.5). To be as conservative as possible, we have not made 
such an adjustment 
   8
returns at any point in time with the cost of equity at the same time. Figure 1 gives a sense of 
the extent to which the hurdle rates can differ across regions simply as a result of this country 
risk premium 
 
Figure 1:  Evolution of country risk premiums over time (1998 –2002) 
 
                                                                                                                           















Source: Own calculation based on data from Moody’s and Bondsonline. 
 
The cost of debt is measured by formula (4) 
 
Cd =  (Rf + Cbp + Crp) * (1-T)     (4) 
 
Where:  rf  = Risk free rate  
    Cbp = Premium for corporate issues 
    Crp  = Country risk premium  
    T = Average effective corporate income tax rate 
 
We used a typical cost of debt for each country. However, we did not estimate the cost 
of debt and its changes resulting from debt renegotiations or restructuring.
10  The risk free rate 
and the country risk premium are estimated as explained earlier. The tax rate is from the 
Price- Waterhouse assessment of the effective corporate income tax rate levied on a medium 
to large size company (defined in terms of sales amount). The rates used are provided in 
Appendix Table A2. The Premium for corporate issues is estimated at 20bp premium over 
sovereign issues.
11  Note also that we did not try to estimate the cost of potential debt 
renegotiation / restructuring.   
 
                                                 
10 This means that we are probably underestimating the effective cost of debt since in developing countries debt 
structures for infrastructure projects are usually much shorter than in developed economies and the transaction 
costs (including numerous fees) associated with the need to regularly restructure or relaunch the debt can be 
quite large and should ideally be added to the nomimal interest rate. But this information is largely viewed by 
bankers to be a commercial secret and can unfortunately not be reflected in the data used here. 
11  Note that we used the same country risk premium (a historical country risk premium) as we did to compute 
the cost of equity.  The country risk premium relevant to compute the cost of debt may however be different 
since the relevant horizon is usually shorter (it would be higher if the risk of investing in a given country is 
perceived as higher in the short term than in the long term, and vice a versa). 











98 99 00 01 02
Low Income Low Middle Income Upper Middle Income











98 99 00 01 02
EAP SA ECA LAC Africa - Mena  9
  Once the hurdle rates has been estimated, i.e. the cost of capital and its components 
including the cost of equity, it is useful to try to generate estimates of the rates of returns on 
assets and on equity to get a sense of the extent to which risks are consistent with the returns 
earned. To do so  we rely on accounting data to measure each company’s overall return on the 
capital invested in each infrastructure project since 1998.
 12 
In theory, several measures of the effective returns earned by the operators can be used 
such as the return on assets, the internal rate of return or the return on equity. The first two 
measures can however not be estimated due to data problems. We have to rely instead on the 
return on equity (RoE) which is the least complete indicator of the three. The return on equity 
(RoE) is a measure of the after tax return the company is earning on its equity capital.  It 
reflects the profits a company is able to generate given the resources provided by its 
shareholders.  It is the ratio of the project’s net income divided by the shareholders’ equity 
investment in the project and can be expressed as: 
RoE =  Net income / Shareholders’ equity       (5) 
 
where:   
Shareholders’ equity  = total assets minus total  liabilities ; 
and, 
Net income = after-tax profit 
 
The main problem with this measure is that it is unclear whether it underestimates or 
overestimates the returns of a business. First, in the short run, it tends to overestimate returns 
because it assumes that all the income generated by a project represents compensation for 
shareholders. Indeed, at least in the early years of a project,  investors receive only a portion 
of a project’s net income. The rest is reinvested in the company and produces income for 
investors only when the company is sold or transferred back to the government—provided 
that transaction occurs at a market price higher than the initial investment and shareholders 
are compensated for the value they created by reinvesting what otherwise would have been 
compensation. Thus the estimates reported here should be seen as a ceiling on shareholders’ 
potential returns in the short to medium run at least. Second, it is the victim of more subtle 
accounting conventions which tend to underestimate the actual returns of these infrastructure 
operations in developing countries. The best known source of underestimation is the fact that 
many infrastructure operators enjoy implicit or explicit management contracts, in addition to 
the concession or license to provide a service. These management contracts tend to give rise 
to fees paid to the headquarters but which appear as cost in the financial accounting of the 
local companies. These fees provide in fact a lower bound for the return to the operation. 
 
With the limitations pointed out throughout this section, the RoE is likely to be an 
upper bound of the return on equity-ignoring the return generated by the management fee.  In 
our analysis, we thus compare the RoE of each company to the corresponding Cost of equity, 
(CE).  When the RoE is higher than the appropriate CE, returns are higher than alternative of 
                                                 
12 Due to data limitations and because many of the companies in the sample are non-traded companies, the study utilizes 
book values (in the weighting of cost of capital) instead of market values. As an unintended, and potentially misleading 
consequence, the resulting WACC may be understated. Conversely, if book values are higher than market values, WACC 
may be erroneously inflated.   10
similar risk. When the RoE is lower than the appropriate CE,  returns are lower  than 
alternative of similar risk and the operators will pull out or not consider further expansions or 
projects. 
 
4.  Estimates of the hurdle rates 
 
The comparison of the cost of capital (WACC)) estimated across regions and country 
groups provides a good sense of the relative competitiveness of these sectors and regions in 
attracting private sector investment in infrastructure. We report only the average over the 
1998-2002 period since it provides the best sense of the perception of the minimum required 
returns by potential investors. It is thus taken to be a fair indicators of expectations.  
 
Figure 2 aggregates the data per developing countries classified according to income 
group levels (low income (LIC), low middle income (LMC) and upper middle income 
(UMC)), ignoring the sectoral differences.
13 The results are as expected, the highest average 
demanded returns (14.9%) are in the lowest income countries and the lowest demanded 
returns are in the highest income countries (around 10%). This is quite consistent with the fact 
that higher perceived risks are expected to yield higher expected returns. More specifically, 
between 1998 and 2002, investors seeking to invest in low income level countries required on 
average, returns around 15% in order to find investments in such countries attractive. The 
same graph shows that investors seeking to invest in countries defined by low-middle income 
levels will require returns around 11% which is not very significantly higher than the 
expectations for upper middle income countries.  














The second aggregation of the data presented is per region, still ignoring sectoral 
differences for now. The results are summarized in Figure 3. The cost of capital varies from 
about 9% to almost 15% under the assumptions we made, most importantly on the cost of 
                                                 
13 This corresponds to the standard World Bank classification. The specific definitions are as follows: Low-income 
economies are those in which 2001 GNI per capita was US$745 or less; low middle-income are those with 2001 GNI per 
capita was between US$745 and US$2,975 and upper-middle-income economies have a 2001 GNI per capita was between 
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Cost of Capital per countries according to Income levels  11
debt and the leverage rates.  The results are somewhat surprising in that they imply that East 
Asia (with a cost of capital of 8.6%) is the region that has best recovered from  … the East 
Asia crisis. Among all regions, the return required were the lowest in East Asia and the 
highest in Africa (Sub-Saharan Africa + the Middle East) and South Asia. Demands in 
Eastern Europe are quite high. The results reflect quite clearly the importance of the risk 
perceptions of the potential investors in the sector right after the 1997 crisis. For many credit 
rating agencies, Latin America was expected to follow East Asia’s fall. As for the poorest 
regions of the world, the sense of risk has always been high and these results do not represent 
significant changes over past experiences. Recent tariff revisions in electricity in Kenya and 
Mali have in fact pointed to cost of capital figures over 20%. 
 






















  From a social viewpoint, these results are disturbing. Indeed, the cost of capital is the 
clearest indicators of what average tariff levels are expected to be. Hence, the comparison of 
cost of capital across regions or income groups gives a sense of the expected differences in 
averages tariffs across these regions and income groups. These results suggest that the poorer 
the country, the higher the risk, and hence the higher the cost of capital which, in turn, implies 
that the poorer the country, the higher the average tariff (all other things, including 
technology, being equal).    
   
  From the database collected, the last thing that can be done with respect to the cost of 
capital is to present sector specific estimates of this cost in the various country groupings. The 
size of the sample does, however, not allow a presentation of the results for the various 
geographical regions. These results for the various sectors are summarized in Figure 4. It 
generally confirms the earlier results. In addition, it shows that expected return on capital 
varied the most for the energy and water sectors between 1998 and 2002. Indeed, it varied 
between 10.7%, for both sector in  upper-middle income level countries, to 15.1% for water 
and 15.6% for energy in low-income level countries. The differences were lower for the 










East Asia & 
Pacific  





A frica & Mena 
Cost of Capital
by Region  12
varied from 11.6% o 13.7%. The railways sector is somewhat unusual in that low middle 
income countries show the highest cost of capital.  
 















It may be useful to point out that even if the cost of capital levels seems to be fairly 
high by comparison to the costs of capital observed in similar industries in OECD countries, 
these numbers benefit from the high leverage of the companies noted earlier which maintains 
the relative importance of the cost of equity low in comparison to the cost of debt. Indeed, the 
average cost of equity estimated for the sample (19.2%, 14.5% and 13.8% respectively for 
LIC, LMC and UMC), is significantly larger than the cost of capital (15.4%, 11.8% and 11%, 
respectively). Figure 5 summarizes the estimates of the cost of equity across sectors for the 
three main income groups. The cross sectoral differences observed for the cost of capital are 
however confirmed with the highest cost of equity for all sectors, except railways, higher than 
19% and above 22% for ports in LICs. 
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5.  Are returns consistent with risks? 
 
The relatively high costs of capital presented in section 4 would not have been a major 
issue if the associated returns had been at matching levels. The fact is, however, that private 
investment in infrastructure declined significantly during the 5 years that followed the Asian 
crisis. This implies that returns have probably not been consistent with the high levels of the 
cost of capital across regions. This would be relatively easy to demonstrate if estimates of the 
internal rate of return  (IRR) for these projects were available for the companies in this 
sample. Indeed, the IRR summarizes in one single number both, the return earned by 
shareholders up to date and the return over the entire life of the project (when the residual 
value at the end of the project is taken into account). The data is however not available. 
14 
 To get a sense of the (mis-)match between risks and return, we rely on a comparison of 
the cost of equity (one of the components of the cost of capital) and of the returns on equity 
(RoE).
15 We present the results per sector, per region and per income level groupings, 
respectively.  
  Starting with the estimates of the average returns per sector, Figure 6 shows that the 
RoE varied considerably across sectors but were lower than costs of equity in every case in 
the 5 years that followed the Asian crisis. The water and railroad sectors had negative average 
returns of –0.14% and –6.7% respectively, while the port and energy sectors had positive 
returns of 6–8%. The main point of Figure 6 however is that none of the sectors managed to 
generate a RoE consistent with the cost of equity. In other words, for no sectors were returns 
consistent with the risk assessed in the post crisis years. 
  
















                                                 
14 The interested reader could refer to Sirtaine et al (2004) who were able to collect the necessary data for a 
sample of Latin American infrastructure companies.  
15 Contrary to the IRR, the RoE is exclusively an annual measure and missed out on the dynamic dimension of infrastructure 
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To complement the figure, it is useful to point out that the two worst performing 
sectors in terms of RoE, water and railways, are also those which showed the highest level of 
volatility as indicated by standard deviations of RoE of respectively 0.23 ad 0.17.
16 These 
relatively high levels of volatility reflect the wide diversity of experiences covered by the 
sample.
 For ports and electricity, it is only 0.9 which is surprisingly low for such a diversified 
sample. 
 
Figure 7 is intended to reveal any possible difference across regions on the gloom 
scenario emerging from the sectoral picture. The story is probably only robust for East Asia 
and Latin America where the number of countries covered by the sample is large enough (30 
and 55 respectively) generating an average RoE of about 11% for East Asia and –0.8% for 
Latin America between 1998 and 2002. The negative returns in Latin America are consistent 
with the slow down observed in private investment in the region. However, East Asia was the 
only on region in which risk and returns were a match! The result for East Asia is in fact quite 
robust since the standard deviation around the mean is only 0.05. The Latin American 
experience showed much more volatility with a standard deviation of 0.19 around the mean.
17 
The other results (RoE of almost 12% for South Asia, 3.7% for Eastern Europe and 0.6% for 
Africa) are however in general interesting to report because they suggest company returns 
varied significantly across regions and not just between East Asia and Latin America.  In 
South Asia and Eastern Europe, the volatility of these RoE was small (0.07 and 0.09 
respectively), while it was quite large in Africa (0.18). 
 


















                                                 
16 Volatility is defined here as the grade of dispersion of the expected return in the sample and is usually 
measured as the annualized standard deviation. The standard deviation is a weighted average of the deviations 
from the expected value and it provides an idea of how far above or below the expected value the actual value is 
likely to be. 
17 The differences in volatility between the two regions also reflects differences in approached to attract private 
investment. In East Asia, project finance approaches dominated, forcing well targeted ring fencing of risks at the 
project levels within sectors, while in Latin America, the dominating approach was the concessioning of services 
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  To get more robust results, it is useful to look at the aggregation of RoE per categories 
of countries classified according their income levels where sample sizes are large enough. 
This is done in Figure 8 which shows that none of the country groups reached their 
corresponding hurdle rates. However, it can be seen that low-income countries, which have a 
riskier (i.e.: higher) hurdle rate have had, on average, quite low returns (5.1%). It is surprising 
though, that returns in upper-middle income countries (1.1%) have been lower than in low-
income countries (5.1%). However, low-middle income countries have, on average, the 
highest returns (7.6%), which is still below the global  developing  countries’s hurdle 
rate(around 14%)—i.e. the one calculated for the whole sample.  As a result, investors in low-
middle income level countries, where the RoE relative to their respective hurdle rates is 
relatively low, experienced the least significant losses between 1998 and 2002. This 
conclusion is strengthened by the analysis of the volatility of returns across income groups. 
This analysis shows that the LMIC also enjoyed the lowest standard deviation (0.06) among 
the three groups. In fact, LIC and UMIC saw relatively strong volatility in their returns with 
standard deviations of 0.15 and 0.17 respectively.  
 

















In sum, the analysis of the match between risk and returns and the stability of the 
returns contributes to explain the major slow down in capital flows relatively well for most 
regions and all income groups. The only exception may be Africa where the huge wedge 
between return on equity and cost of equity is reflected in the low absolute levels of 
investment but not in the somewhat unexpected increase in the flows of investments observed 
over the last three years.
18  Overall, only 32 of the 120 companies covered by this sample 
enjoyed an RoE larger than their CoE during the post Asia crisis period, implying that two 
thirds had bad experiences and would probably be reluctant to disburse or even commit 
significant new investments. This is particularly true for the rail and water sectors since thye 
represented only 25% the successful companies. The rest were in energy and ports.  
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6.  Are things improving since the beginning of the crisis? 
 
Now that the average mismatch between returns and risks has been established 
quantitatively, the remaining fact to document is the extent to which things have improved 
since the East Asia crisis. To do so we report the evolution of the CoE and the RoE on an 
annual basis between 1998 and 2002. Figure 9 does it for the infrastructure sector as a whole 
for the full set of countries as well as for each region. Figure 10 does it for each sector.  
  
Our sample suggests  that while returns on equity varied considerably across regions 
with a downward trend, the costs of equity has generally been essentially flat during the 
period. For the full sample, the gap between return and cost of equity has in fact increased 
suggesting that on average the prospects for private sector participation did not improve for 
the sector. In fact, they deteriorated between 1998 and 2002.  
 
At the regional level, the only region with a clear positive story is East Asia where the 
gap between returns and costs has shrunk and has been almost eliminated by the end of 2002. 
South Asia and Eastern Europe is not too far behind but the volatility of the returns over time 
has continued to be a problem in both regions. For Africa and Latin America, the wedge 
between returns and the cost of equity has increased over time. Interestingly enough the two 
poorest regions, Africa and South Asia, were the only two to show a positive net return on 
equity at the beginning of the period but both loose that advantage over time, Africa much 
faster and dramatically than South Asia. 
 
At this level of aggregation, the results are somewhat surprising for all regions but 
East Asia. The expectation was that regions would eventually recover everywhere but that 
expectation had not been met as of end of 2002. Every region seems to have its own 
dynamics, which adds to the bad reputation that the sector gained when many of the deals 
which had been signed in East Asia fell apart with the crisis. In South Asia, a number of sour 
deals in energy in India and Pakistan as well as a number of never closed high profile deals in 
all countries of the region may are maintaining the equity costs high. In Eastern Europe, a 
series of crisis in Russia and failed deals in a  number of other countries of the region (toll 
roads and/or rail and water in Hungary, Poland, Ukraine,...) have contributed to the volatility 
over time of returns independently of the East Asia crisis. In Africa, frustration with high 
transaction costs have maintained cost high and the declining ability to generate cash from 
basic public services in many countries have contributed to a deterioration of equity returns. 
As for Latin America, the financial performance of the sector simply echoes the major 
financial crisis that it some of the largest actors in the infrastructure reform experience.  It 
could be argued that in Brazil the Asian crisis had a dramatic effect since it hit many of the 
energy and toll roads deals that were about or had just been signed in the country. The slow 
adjustment of Brazil then had macroeconomic effects in Argentina where additional internal 
fiscal problems fueled the crisis that culminated in January 2002. Bolivia and Peru, the other 
two major countries with a large number of PPI deals saw their own versions of the 
macroeconomic crisis.  In all countries, operators were hit on the cost side as well as on the 
return side through a rapidly shrinking demand stemming from rapidly rising levels of 
unemployment.          17
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  In terms of income groups, the emerging story is much clearer as seen in Figure 10. In 
a nutshell,  LMIC are been doing quite well since the crisis except maybe in 2002 where the 
Argentina crisis had ripple effects in a large number of countries, in particular in Latin 
America. The UMIC, which include many of the Latin American countries with private sector 
operators of infrastructure services have been doing quite poorly since the Asian crisis. The 
LIC have also been doing poorly although they seem to have seen their situation get worse 
later than the other regions. In fact, they seem to have lagged reaction to all international 
crisis since in 2002 they did relatively well in comparison to higher income countries. 























As for the emerging sectoral story, Figure 11 shows the major insights. The first 
observation is that in none of the sectors have the returns been high enough to cover the cost 
of equity throughout the period. Moreover, while the cost of equity has remained relatively 
stable, the returns on equity have evolved quite differently across sectors. Return have been 
following a declining trend in water and railways. They have in fact been negative every 
single year for railways throughout the period. The energy and the ports sector have been 
relatively well off in comparison. 
To put things in perspective, it is useful to point out that both the water sectors and the 
railways sectors required very significant capital investments, that were heavily  financed in 
foreign currency by external supporting agencies such as banks, international corporations or 
private investments. As a consequence, they were much more dramatically hit by the crisis, 
not only in East Asia but also in other parts of the developing world. Consider the fact that 
water operators were forced to pull out of their deals in developing countries. Energy 
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During 1998–2002 overall shareholder returns in our sample were insufficient relative to the 
risks taken. Thus most infrastructure companies are not particularly attractive investment 
opportunities—though there are notable caveats to this conclusion. Moreover, water and 
railway investments did worse than port and energy investments. 
 
Investors in East Asia and the Pacific, South Asia, and to a lesser extent Europe and 
Central Asia did better than those in Latin America and Africa and the Middle East. And 
because the former regions are less risky, they have greater potential to become more 
attractive to investors. In addition, lower-middle-income countries appear to have a brighter 
investment outlook than low-income and upper-middle-income countries. 
 
  The main question to emerge from this analysis may thus be: If things are that bad, 
why are companies not pulling out? A first answer has to do with the life cycle view of the 
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longer-term perspective reflected in their assessment of the IRR. The poor financial 
performance may be bad enough to slow down new projects, but not yet bad enough, at least 
in general, to motivate a pull out.  
 
A second answer has to do with the creative accounting games that seem to 
characterize the sector. A foreign company declaring losses in a host country can distribute 
dividends on the same deal at headquarters. This is not contradictory at all; it simply reflects 
the weakness of international accounting standards and guidelines. In infrastructure, one of 
the most unusual characteristics of accounting rules relates to management fees. Current 
practice in developing countries allows the payment by a local concessionaire managed by a 
foreign company to be deducted as a cost locally but this payment is credited as income at the 
headquarters of the foreign company. This is not very different from what transfer pricing 
does for competitive companies. From the viewpoint of a regulated company, however, the 
implication is that the foreign company ends up having a guaranteed minimum return on 
equity, which in the host country is reflected in the revenue requirements used to assess the 
tariff level needed to cover the cost of capital, but is ignored in the revenue sources of the 
operator. In the other words, the investors make money twice on this specific component of 
the deal.  
 
  Thus, the main question emerging points to a fairly simple but crucial policy message: 
accounting transparency matters to the users but it drives the average tariff! This conclusion 
for the infrastructure sectors is, as expected, not very different from the conclusion obtained 
from analysis covering a wider set of sectors. For instance, there is quite a bit of evidence that 
more transparent accounting standards are associated with lower costs of capital in general 
and across countries. Indeed, this has been documented in the debate on the importance of 
closure rules (see for instance, Botosan (1997),  Hail (2002) or Hail and Leuz (2003). It has 
also been documented in the context of assessments of the impact of corruption on the costs 
of borrowing for developing countries (Ciocchini, Durbin and Ng (2002)).  
 
  To conclude, it is probably fair to argue that this paper can only claim to be a first cut 
at processing the new information collected. While the benchmarks provided for the various 
key financial variables of the sector may be useful, much more work is needed, in particular 
more analytical work documenting the relationship between investment flows and financial 
costs and returns. Many other variables, including institutional and governance variables, 
need to be taken into account (as done by Hail and Luez (2004), for instance). In many ways, 
this additional analysis is needed not only to test the robustness of the sometimes surprising 
evidence presented in this paper but also to raise many more questions on the actual relevance 
of all these additional variables to achieve effective public partnerships in the interest of the 
infrastructure users in the poorest countries of the world. Indeed, while the potential and the 
need for a good public partnership in infrastructure continues to be strong, the evidence on its 
effectiveness continues to be mixed from a fiscal and a social viewpoint, revealing the 
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Appendix :   
Table A1  Historical interest rates on US treasury bonds and Stocks S&P 
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Count ry   
Corporat e  
I ncom e Tax  
Rat e
A rgentina  35%
Bol i vi a  25%
Br a z i l   34%
B ulgaria  24%
Cam eroon  39%
Czech Republ i c 31%
Chi l e  35%
Chi na 33%
C o lo m b ia  35%
Cot e  d 'Ivoire 35%
Ecuador  25%
Egypt   42%
Et hi opi a  40%
Es t oni a  26%
G uat em al a 38%
G i orgi a 20%
Ho n d u r a s   25%




Ko r e a   25%
M ali 3 5 %
M auritan ia  25%
Me x i c o   36%
M alaysia  28%
Mo r o c c o   35%
Mo z a mb i q u e 35%
Panam a 30%
Paki st an 45%
P h ilip p in es 3 2 %
Pol and 22%
Rom ani a 25%
R ussia  35%
Senegal  35%
Sl oveni a  30%
South A frica 30%
Sr i  Lanka  25%
T hailan d   30%
Tur key  30%
U nited  S tates o f A m erica 35%
V enezuela  34%